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Christopher	Phelps	&	Associates	v.	Wayne	
Galloway	v.	Simonini	Builders,	Inc.,	United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3117 (2007).
Wayne Galloway set out to build his 
retirement home on Lake Wylie, NC south of 
Charlotte.  Given common misconceptions 
folks have about copyright, the facts are utterly 
believable.  Galloway was mad at his architect 
and went with his son to the more upscale Lake 
Norman on the other side of Charlotte where he 
saw the French-country house of his dreams. 
He asked the builder — Simonini Builders 
— for a copy of the plans.  They referred him 
to the homeowner, Mrs. Gina Bridgeford.
She figured she had paid so much for the 
plans that she owned them.  Her only concern 
was he not put up an identical house near her. 
Galloway told her he was going 30 miles 
away. 
Each page of the plans had a copyright 
notice of Phelps & Assoc. and plainly stating 
that the purchaser “is authorized to construct 
one and only one home using this plan.  Modi-
fication or reuse is prohibited.”
Galloway changed the name and address 
from Bridgeford to Galloway, copied the 
plans and set to work on his home as his own 
general contractor.  Some of the subs phoned 
Phelps asking questions about the windows, 
and thus Phelps got wind of the piracy.  One of 
the subs realized what was going on and tried 
to warn Galloway who replied: 
“They’ve got to find me, catch me first.”
Yes, how often you’ve found comfort in 
that notion when you were blithely photo-
copying something you shouldn’t.  Pages of 
paper can be cached, but a house does kind 
of stand out.
Well, Phelps did find out and sent Gal-
loway a threatening lawyer letter.  Galloway 
stopped construction.
Phelps rushed to register their copyright, 
but you’re up to date on this and know it’s not 
essential to have copyright, but is essential if 
you want to sue.  Then Phelps sued asking 
for damages, disgorgement of profits and an 
injunction.
Enjoining what, you ask.  And you shall 
find out directly.
The district court jury gave Phelps $20,000, 
the fee normally charged for such a design. 
There were no profits to disgorge.
An injunction used to belong to that old 
friend the King’s Chancellor, later the Chan-
cery Courts of England and the Equity Courts 
of the US of A.  Which is to say it’s not a jury 
issue.
The district court denied an injunction, 
saying Phelps had been made whole.  Phelps 
wanted the injunction to prohibit the lease or 
sale of the house and the return or shredding 
of the plans.  Phelps of course appealed, or we 
wouldn’t be reading this.
Interesting.  And of course you’ve jumped 
ahead of me and are asking what will happen 
when Galloway kicks the bucket.  Will his heirs 
be enjoined from leasing or selling?
We’re in the Fourth Circuit.  Appeal goes 
from NC to Richmond, VA., a courtroom of dire 
memory where I was once treated with contu-
mely by a three judge panel for trying to create 
an implied cause of action.  But that’s a tale 
I can tell in the Old Lawyer’s Home.
The Fourth Circuit said the injunc-
tion denial was perfectly proper. 
Giving Phelps what they asked for 
would unduly restrain the alienation 
of real property.
And of course you’ve already 
thought of the what if the heirs don’t 
have the money to pay the taxes.  They 
have to lose the house to the county rather than 
sell it?  And what if there are multiple heirs 
and they can’t agree on the use of house?  The 
parade of “what ifs”that would force a sale 
just goes on and on.
The disgorgement of profit Phelps sought 
was measured as the difference between the 
cost of construction and the value of the house. 
The architects claimed the house was worth 
$1.1 mil for a profit of $200,000.  Galloway 
in turn said he had no profit were it sold, but 
rather a loss of $160,000.
The Rest of the Appeal
The trial judge had instructed the jury that 
the Bridgeford house plans were a derivative 
work which is to say an earlier design had been 
given a bit of tweaking.  And he went on to say 
Phelps only owned the tweaked bits and not the 
preexisting material.  He seemed to base this on 
the fact that registration had only been done for 
the Bridgeford plans and not the earlier one it 
was derived from.
The Fourth Circuit said, yes, that’s true if 
the underlying work was in the public domain 
or owned by somebody else.  But Phelps had 
done the first drawing that was tweaked into 
the Bridgeford one.
As to the registration of copyright, the filing 
only serves to provide evidence of copyright 
and is required before you can file a lawsuit. 
Copyright attaches when the work is fixed in 
a tangible medium.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 
408(a), 410, 411.
Although the first design was not registered, 
the registration of the Bridgeford design 
sufficed for suit on the kit-and-kaboodle. 
See Xoom	v.	Imageline,	Inc., 323 F.3d 279, 
283-84 (4th Cir. 2003); 2 Melville B. Nimmer 
& David Nimmer, Nimmer	 on	 Copyright § 
7.16[B][2][c], at 7-173 (perm. ed., 
rev. vol. 2006).
But it was harmless error!
The judge told the jury Phelps 
was entitled to actual damages and 
to all profits.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
What he actually said was:
“Actual damages for infringe-
ment are measured according to 
market value, which means what 
a willing buyer would have been 
reasonably required to pay a will-
ing seller for the copyright holder’s 
work.”
Which was the $20-thou that 
Bridgeford paid.
Had the jury actually been paying at-
tention to what the judge said about derivative 
works, they would have merely given Phelps 
the value of some altered windows.
On the profit issue, he said: “An infringer’s 
profits consist of the amount of the infringer’s 
gross revenues from the infringing activity 
less the expenses of producing the infringing 
work.”
The burden was on Galloway on the profit 
issue, and the jury was apparently satisfied with 
his data that showed a loss.
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Now How About That Injunction?
Phelps wanted to (1) prohibit the comple-
tion of the house, and (??) (2) prohibit its sale 
or lease.  They argued that being made whole 
was not enough.  Under a threat of continuing 
infringement an injunction was required.  Walt	
Disney	Co.	v.	Powell, 283 U.S. App. D.C. 111, 
897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
The Fourth Circuit said there was nothing 
automatic about injunction; it was entirely dis-
cretionary.  See eBay	Inc.	v.	MercExchange,	
LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
Ceasing construction was moot as the house 
was virtually completed.
Phelps argued that they have the exclusive 
right to sell or lease their copyrighted work. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).  And Galloway had 
to be shut out of this possibility for the 95 year 
life of the copyright.
The Fourth Circuit found an exception in 
the “first sale doctrine” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
This permits a purchaser of a particular copy 
(the Galloway house) to sell or otherwise 
dispose of it.  Galloway has paid his $20-thou 
and can now sell the house.
Phelps countered that the first sale had to 
be a lawful one and Galloway’s skullduggery 
tainted the whole transaction and deprived him 
of his rights.
The Fourth Circuit said that might be true 
if the house sale was going down before the 
$20-thou judgment.  See, Palmetto	Builders	&	
Designers,	Inc.	v.	Unireal,	Inc., 342 F. Supp. 
2d 468,473 (D.S.C. 2004).  But now after the 
pay-off, the house becomes a lawfully-made 
copy.  The analogy was to a converter who 
got sued and paid the full value of the per-
sonal property that he absconded with.  He 
now has title.
For you lay-folk, conversion is a blanket 
civil tort for any making off with someone else’s 
personal property, or chattel as it was once 
called in olde Anglo Saxon.  On the criminal 
side this might be larceny, burglary, embezzle-
ment, armed robbery or whatever.  Which 
sounds like you could covet your neighbor’s 
ox or ass, but if he didn’t want to sell, you’d 
take it at gunpoint and then pay him the value. 
In fact, you face the criminal law as well and 
will be looking at jail time.  So don’t try that 
in your own neighborhood.
In the case of patents and copyright, the first 
sale doctrine does not merely include voluntary 
sales, but might be a compulsory transfer such 
as a judicial sale or court-compelled assign-
ment.  The only question is whether the patent 
or copyright holder has gotten his just reward. 
Platt	&	Munk	Co.	v.	Republic	Graphics,	Inc., 
315 F2d 847,854 (2d Cir. 1963).
Phelps said a pirate taking your stuff and 
then paying you the value after you sue is 
equivalent to a compulsory license, which is 
largely a no-no.  See Sony	 Corp.	 of	Am.	 v.	
Universal	 City	 Studios,	 Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
446 n.28, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, saying 
copyright piracy was not an enforced license 
because the potential damages paid by the 
pirate were so much broader than just pay-
ing the standard license fee.  In addition to 
the actual damages and profit disgorgement, 
the court might order the destruction of the 
infringing article.  See 17 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
And in the ordinary theft type situation, this 
is typically done.  See, e.g., Loud	 Records,	
LLC	v.	Lambright, Civ. No. 1:05-0171, 2006 
U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 38016 (S.D. W.Va., March 
30, 2006).
As to houses, it’s true they contain the 
architect’s expression, but their character is 
predominantly functional.  Before the Berne 
Convention, there was no protection for con-
structed architectural works at all.  See 1 
Nimmer & Nimmer, supra, § 2.08[D][2][b], at 
2-126.  This was changed by the Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act, but Congress 
has been pretty clear about not having automat-
ic injunctions on pirated building designs.
The court talks about “encumbering” all 
kinds of property along with the design such as 
swimming pool, building materials, fence, etc. 
What they really mean is you’d be destroying 
a whole bunch of value when the copyright 
owner had already been paid off.  See Bucklew	
v	Hawkins,	Ash,	Baptie	&	Co., 329 F3d 923, 
931 (7th Cir. 2003).
What Phelps has frosted is not just the 
usual moral indignation over someone tak-
ing your design, but the fact that they got no 
disgorgement of profits.  Otherwise, Galloway 
doesn’t own their design and can’t copy it in 
another house.
Unless, I guess, he rushed and built it 
in its entirety before they caught him again. 
Perhaps he could put up a whole sub-division 
of identical Phelps’ designed French-country 
houses.    
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QUESTION:		How	are	oral	history	record-
ings	 and	 transcripts	 affected	 by	 copyright?	
Once	 the	 interviewee	 is	 deceased,	 does	 the	
library	 that	 holds	 the	 recordings	 and	 tran-
scripts	have	any	restrictions?
ANSWER:  Oral histories present inter-
esting copyright issues for libraries.  Older 
histories, such as those recorded as WPA 
projects during the Depression, may have little 
documentation concerning releases, etc.  Today, 
most interviewers require the interviewee (per-
son being interviewed) to sign a release.  The 
release states what will be done with record-
ing, the transcript, etc.  Assuming that there 
is no release oral histories clearly 
belong to the interviewee, although 
the interviewer may hold copyright 
in the question he or 
she poses.  The most 
important material, 
however, is the text or 
words spoken by the 
interviewee, and the 
interviewee owns the 
copyright in his or her 
words.  
Through a release, 
the interviewee may 
give the library all rights to use, publish and 
distribute via the Web an oral history.  Death 
of the interviewee changes only who owns the 
copyright.  It passes to the heirs of the deceased 
interviewee; therefore, the library still may not 
do as it pleases with the recording and tran-
script unless there was a release that permits 
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an unaffiliated patron?  Should the lending 
library be notified of the status of the user? 
Is	this	activity	“systematic”	distribution	under	
section	108(g)(1)?
ANSWER:  The unaffiliated status of the 
user is not particularly relevant in the interli-
brary loan equation.  The issue is whether the 
borrowing library counts the ILL request in its 
suggestion of five and pays royalties when it 
exceeds the CONTU guidelines.  If the user’s 
request will take the library over the suggestion 
of five, then royalties should be included in 
the cost recovery calculation.  The legislative 
history that accompanied the Copyright Act 
indicated that while the system of interlibrary 
loan may be systematic, the use of ILL alone 
does not violate section 108(g)(1).
QUESTION:	 	Is	 the	 library	 liable	when	
a	 user	 infringes	 copyright	 by	 downloading	
from	an	electronic	database	an	entire	online	
textbook?
ANSWER:  Generally no.  License 
agreements typically detail the rights and 
